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We conducted a unique randomized experiment to estimate the impact of alternative cash transfer
delivery mechanisms on household demand for routine preventative health services in rural Burkina
Faso. The two-year pilot program randomly distributed cash transfers that were either conditional
or unconditional and were given to either mothers or fathers. Families under the conditional cash transfer
schemes were required to obtain quarterly child growth monitoring at local health clinics for all children
under 60 months old. There were no such requirements under the unconditional programs. Compared
with control group households, we find that conditional cash transfers significantly increase the number
of preventative health care visits during the previous year, while unconditional cash transfers do not
have such an impact. For the conditional cash transfers, transfers given to mothers or fathers showed
similar magnitude beneficial impacts on increasing routine visits.
Richard Akresh
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Department of Economics
1407 West Gregory Drive





Development Research Group 
1818 H Street, NW







and William Spears School of Business
harounan.kazianga@okstate.edu  2
1. Introduction 
Poor health is widespread among children in low-income countries. Often, such ill health is 
coupled with poor access to health care, either because of supply-side or demand-side 
constraints. These poor health outcomes negatively affect physical growth and cognitive 
development, with potential long-term consequences. For example, children who are in poor 
health are less likely to enroll in school, or enter school later, and when they enroll they tend to 
perform worse than children in good health (Moock and Leslie 1986; Brooker, Hall, and Bundy 
1999; Glewwe, Jacoby, and King 2001). This in turn affects productivity later in life (Dasgupta 
1993; Strauss and Thomas 1995; Schultz 2001). It is estimated that illness incidence and other 
health risks prevent approximately 200 million children in low income countries from reaching 
their full potential in cognitive development (Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). Obviously, 
identifying mechanisms that could improve health outcomes among children will have large 
payoffs, not only at the individual level, but also in term of overall economic progress as well. 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are now one of the most popular government 
welfare interventions in developing countries.
1 These programs transfer resources to poor 
households conditional on the family taking measures to increase the health and human capital of 
their children (predominantly enrolling their children in school and taking them for regular 
health care visits). Unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programs do not impose these 
conditionality constraints. CCT programs represent a “top-down” approach in which outside 
organizations decide what is best for poor children and provide incentives to their parents to 
achieve these objectives. In contrast, UCT programs assume that, once a budget constraint is 
                                                 
1 Numerous countries in Latin America, as well as in Asia have implemented such programs (Fiszbein and Schady 
2009). In Africa, several CCT pilot programs (in South Africa and Kenya) have been implemented but focus 
exclusively on orphans and HIV households and have not yet been rigorously evaluated, while other pilot programs 
(in Malawi and Morocco) are currently being evaluated (see Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler 2011 for information about 
the Malawi evaluation) but focus mainly on educational outcomes or adolescent children.   3
relaxed, parents are in a better position to make appropriate decisions regarding their child’s 
human capital. CCT programs are also more costly per recipient to administer than UCT 
programs because of the costs associated with monitoring conditions. Unconditional cash 
transfers act through increased income, so that health outcomes should improve as long as the 
income elasticity of demand for health is positive and marginal productivity of health care is 
positive (Parker and Wong, 1998). Mounting evidence shows both types of transfers improve 
child health outcomes (for CCTs in Colombia (Attanasio, Gomez, Heredia, and Vera-Hernandez 
2005), Ecuador (Paxson and Schady 2008), Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores 2005; Macours, 
Schady, and Vakis 2008); and for UCTs in South Africa (Case and Deaton 1998; Case, 
Hosegood, and Lund 2005; Duflo 2003)), but the evidence on which mechanisms–conditionality 
or income effects- are playing a role in driving the impacts is more limited.
2 
In this paper, we present evidence of the impacts of a unique cash transfer pilot program 
in rural Burkina Faso, the Nahouri Cash Transfers Pilot Project (NCTPP), on the take-up of 
routine preventative health clinic visits. The NCTPP incorporated a random experimental design 
to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the following four cash transfer programs targeting poor 
households in rural Burkina Faso: conditional cash transfers given to fathers, conditional cash 
transfers given to mothers, unconditional cash transfers given to fathers, and unconditional cash 
transfers given to mothers. Our evaluation focuses on health utilization for children 0 to 59 
months old, in particular their visits to health clinics for routine preventative care. Even by 
African standards, child health outcomes in Burkina Faso are considered to be poor. In 2003, 
                                                 
2 However, not all impact studies show consistently positive results for these programs, and differences tend to 
depend on the specific details about the cash transfer program, the age range of the child studied, the evaluation 
method, and whether the evaluations were measuring short or medium term impacts. Even for outcomes that were 
directly conditioned upon, such as preventative health clinic visits, evaluations for Chile (Galasso 2006), Ecuador 
(Paxson and Schady 2008), and Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores 2005) show no significant change in the number of 
visits to the health clinic for preventative reasons, while there were positive impacts on routine health check-ups in 
Colombia (Attanasio et al. 2005), Honduras (Morris, Flores, Olinto, and Medina 2004), and Jamaica (Levy and Ohls 
2007).   4
38.7 percent of children under 59 months were 2 standard deviations below the reference 
population for height-for-age, 18.6 percent for weight-for-height and 37.7 percent for weight-for-
age (INSD/ORC Macro, 2004). Similarly, 38 percent of children in that age group experienced 
some form of fever or respiratory infection in the two weeks preceding the national Demographic 
and Health Survey. Among children who had been ill, only 30 percent received any care from a 
health professional (INSD/ORC Macro, 2004). 
We find that children under age five in families that received conditional cash transfers 
have 0.43 more visits to the health clinic for routine preventative care during the previous year 
compared to children in control households, a 49 percent increase compared to the mean in the 
control group. We find similar magnitude beneficial impacts for children in families where the 
mother or father received conditional cash transfers, indicating that at least when the transfers are 
conditional, the gender of the cash transfer recipient is not a critical factor influencing the 
frequency of routine health facility visits. In contrast, we do not find beneficial effects from 
unconditional cash transfers that are given to either mothers or fathers. This highlights the point 
that at least for this particular outcome of routine preventative health clinic visits, conditionality 
is more important than transfer recipient gender in increasing health clinic utilization for 
children. 
Our experimental design has several distinctive features differentiating it from other 
studies. First, we randomly test conditional and unconditional cash transfers in the same 
environment, which allows us to determine whether the key factor driving impacts is an income 
effect or conditionality.
3 Second, unlike many cash transfer programs that pay the transfers to 
                                                 
3 A recent study by de Brauw and Hoddinott (2007) makes use of administrative errors in Mexico to try to untangle 
how much of any observed program impact is due to the program’s income transfers and how much is due to the 
conditionality forcing households to undertake specific behaviors in order to receive the funds. Baird, McIntosh and   5
mothers with the hope mothers will spend the money more wisely, we randomly selected 
mothers or fathers to receive the payments. Hence we contribute to the long-standing question on 
the effects of resources controlled by the mother or the father on a child’s human capital. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the cash transfer 
pilot program as well as its experimental design and presents some descriptive statistics from the 
household survey. Section 3 discusses our empirical identification strategy and Section 4 
presents main results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Burkina Faso Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project 
2.1. Program Design 
The pilot cash transfer program was conducted in Nahouri province in southern Burkina Faso, 
located approximately 100 miles from the capital, Ouagadougou. The 75 villages in Nahouri 
province that each have a primary school were randomly allocated to the following five groups 
(see Figure 1, panel A): (i) conditional cash transfers given to the father (CCTF), (ii) conditional 
cash transfers given to the mother (CCTM), (iii) unconditional cash transfers given to the father 
(UCTF), (iv) unconditional cash transfers given to the mother (UCTM), and (v) a control group. 
There were 15 villages in each treatment arm and in the control group. Based on our experience 
with previous randomized program evaluations in Burkina Faso, as well as qualitative focus 
groups we conducted in Nahouri province, we believed that transparency in the randomization 
process was critical for maintaining a household’s participation in the surveys and to guarantee 
the local authorities’ support. Therefore, the village-level treatment randomization took place 
during a public meeting in the Nahouri provincial capital in which each village was represented 
by their local leaders. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Özler (2011) also report results from a randomized experiment in Malawi comparing conditional and unconditional 
cash transfers, but their target population are adolescent girls and they mainly focus on education outcomes.   6
In the next stage, in each of the 60 villages that were randomly selected to receive a cash 
transfer program, all poor eligible households were present for a participatory lottery to 
randomly assign those households to either receive or not receive the particular type of transfer 
allocated to that village. To determine whether a household was eligible (based on their poverty 
status) to take part in the lottery, immediately prior to the baseline survey, we conducted an 
extended household census in every village to collect information from each household about 
household living structure (cement or mud brick walls, metal or straw roof, flooring, access to 
latrine), household asset ownership (plow, cart, draft animals, motorcycle, radio), whether the 
head of household ever attended school, whether the household grows cotton, and whether there 
was a weekly market in the village. We combined this information with a Burkina Faso 
nationally representative household survey to calculate a predicted consumption level for each 
household and compare that with the national poverty line to determine whether a household is 
considered poor and subsequently is eligible to receive the cash transfer. Given the government 
transfer program’s limited budget, in consultation with village leaders, we decided that 
randomization was the fairest way to determine which poor eligible households receive a 
transfer, and everyone was aware that not all poor households in a given village would be 
receiving a transfer during the pilot program. 
We conducted three rounds of surveys (baseline, one-year follow-up, two-year follow-up) 
in June 2008, June 2009, and June 2010,  interviewing all poor households eligible to receive a 
transfer in each of the treatment villages and who had been randomly selected to receive the 
transfer. In each of these four groups of 15 villages, we interviewed approximately 540 poor 
households randomly selected to receive transfers. The control group consisted of 615 randomly   7
selected poor households that did not receive a cash transfer in the 15 control villages where no 
households received cash transfers. 
Among households randomly assigned to a CCT scheme, for their children under age six, 
the conditions imposed were quarterly visits to the local health clinic for child growth 
monitoring, while for children age seven to fifteen, the conditions were school enrollment with 
an attendance rate above 90 percent each quarter. In the villages randomly assigned to 
conditional cash transfers, satisfaction of the conditions was assessed using a family booklet in 
which the school teachers and the health workers signed and stamped the booklet for a given 
child to confirm school attendance and health visits, respectively. Further, in the CCT villages, 
local village committees, which had received specific training, randomly selected 20 percent of 
the booklets and verified the information reported in those with data from the school attendance 
registers and the health center visits register. 
For families randomly assigned to a UCT program, the mother or father received a 
quarterly stipend for each child without conditions. For each child under age six, in the CCT and 
UCT programs, the mother or father would receive 1000 FCFA per quarter, for a total of 4000 
FCFA per year. Using the exchange rate during the 2008 baseline of 415 FCFA = $1 USD, the 
annual transfer was worth approximately $9.64, which is 9 percent of household per capita 
expenditures. For each child age 7 to 10 (or in grades 1 to 4), the mother or father would receive 
2000 FCFA per quarter (8000 FCFA per year), while for each child age 11 to 15 (or in grades 5 
or higher), the mother or father would receive 4000 FCFA per quarter (16,000 FCFA per year).
4 
There was no household transfer cap amount, so that each age eligible child could participate 
irrespective of the composition of the family. The transfers were made in cash during a quarterly 
                                                 
4 To minimize child fostering in response to the program introduction and reduce any potential sample attrition (see 
Akresh 2009 for evidence on the relationship between income shocks and child fostering), eligibility for cash 
transfers was based only on the children present in the household at the time of the baseline survey.   8
visit conducted by the program staff. Cash transfers were disbursed during the academic school 
year 2008-2009 (October 2008 to June 2009) and 2009-2010 (October 2009 to June 2010). The 
program design assumes that each of the treatment groups would receive equal amounts of 
resources per capita over the two-year transfer program period if households randomly allocated 
to the conditional cash transfers fully satisfied the conditions. 
Meetings were also organized between the central government and the provincial health 
and education authorities to ensure the full participation of school administrators (principals and 
teachers) and health administrators (doctors and nurses) in the program. This included ensuring 
their role in verifying the cash transfer conditionality. However, no other changes were made to 
and no additional government funds were provided for the supply of education or health services.  
2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Households in the Nahouri region are predominantly subsistence farmers growing sorghum and 
groundnuts and have mean annual per capita expenditures of approximately $111 USD. 
Summary statistics in Table 1 show that on average, there are 7.0 members in each household, of 
whom 1.5 are children under 60 months and 2.3 are children age 5 to 15. Focusing on the 
children under 60 months old that are used in this paper’s analysis, 49.4 percent of them are 
female and their average age is 30.7 months old.
5 Only 18.5 percent of these children’s parents 
(father or mother) have ever been enrolled in school. On average, children have 1.03 routine 
preventative health clinic visits per year, although younger children (0-23 months) have more 
visits (1.43) than older (24-59 months) children (0.80).
6 
                                                 
5 Note that of the poor eligible surveyed households in the treatment and control villages, only 1618 households are 
used in the health analysis for this paper, because the remaining households did not have any children under 60 
months old.  
6 The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends the following schedule for preventive childhood health care 
visits: birth, 2 months, 4 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months, 15 months, 18 months, 24 months, 36 months, 48 
months, 60 months.   9
The health care system in rural Burkina Faso is relatively underdeveloped. In the 75 
survey villages, not every village has a health clinic, but the median distance to the nearest health 
clinic is only two kilometers (average distance is 2.85 kilometers). This is below the Burkina 
Faso national average distance to a basic health care center, which is 7.5 kilometers (Ministry of 
Health 2007). In addition, there are no statistically significant differences across treatment and 
control groups in the average distance to a health clinic. 
Access to basic health care remains poor in Burkina Faso. In 2007, only 36 percent of the 
population had access to basic health care (Ministry of Heath 2010). The available data also 
suggest that the health system is under-staffed. In 2009, the ratios of total population to health 
care professionals indicate there are 22,522 people per physician, 94,564 per pharmacist, and 
2,892 people per nurse (Ministry of Health 2010). The poor access to health services translates 
into lower utilization of health care, especially preventive health care. In rural Burkina Faso, it is 
estimated that only 60 percent of baby deliveries are attended by a trained health care provider, 
with large variations across regions (INSD/ORC Macro 2010). Noticeable exceptions include 
immunization coverage (more than 80 percent of children in rural areas) and utilization of 
prenatal care (around 94 percent of pregnant women in rural area). 
In Table 2, we use baseline data to test the balance of the randomization experiment. We 
first present the mean of the specific variable measured at the baseline for the control group and 
each of the four treatment arms. In the subsequent columns, we present p-values from a Wald 
test comparing the treatment arm with control group. Finally, in the last column (under the 
control group heading), we present the p-value for an F-test of the joint test that the means of the 
five groups are equal. Results show balance across characteristics for children, parents, and 
measures of supply-side health clinic quality. The main dependent variable used in this paper,   10
routine preventative health clinic visits, was only collected in the final survey round, so we are 
unable to examine whether the variable exhibits balance in the baseline round (pre-intervention) 
across the treatment and control groups.
7 
Household attrition was very low between the baseline and one-year follow-up survey 
(1.42 percent), and increases slightly when comparing the baseline and two-year follow-up 
survey (4.62 percent). In Table 3, we explore the relative differences between attritor and non-
attritor households. Column 1 presents means of the household-level characteristics from the 
baseline survey for the sample of households that were followed from the baseline to the two-
year follow-up survey (non-attritors). Column 2 presents means for the sample of attritor 
households, and column 3 presents the average difference in characteristics between attritors and 
non-attritors, as well as a test of whether the difference is statistically significant. Results suggest 
that attrition is not likely random, as attritors are more likely to come from smaller households, 
with fewer adults, are younger, have fewer wives, and are more likely to be female headed 
households. However, what is more relevant for our analysis is whether attrition differs across 
treatment and control groups. In columns 4 to 7 of Table 3, we present difference-in-differences 
regressions for each characteristic comparing the difference between attritors and non-attritors in 
each specific treatment arm with the same difference between attritors and non-attritors in the 
control group, and we find few significant differences. 
3. Empirical Identification Strategy 
The key question we want to answer is whether cash transfers increased the frequency of routine 
preventative visits to health facilities by young children in recipient households. The 
experimental design provides a strong identification strategy and allows us to attribute any 
                                                 
7 However, we are able to test baseline balance for other health outcomes for which we do have three rounds of data, 
such as the probability the child was sick during the past month, health clinic utilization, and illness duration, and all 
of these exhibit balance across randomized treatment and control groups in the baseline.   11
differences in outcome indicators (frequency of preventative visits to health clinics) between the 
treatment and control groups to the impact of the program. Because precise questions about the 
purpose of the visits to the health clinics were only included in the last round of data collection 
(Round 3), we cannot use a difference-in-differences model. We rely on the program 
randomization to identify causal impacts of alternative cash transfer delivery mechanisms on 
routine health clinic visits. Since Table 2 indicates that health behaviors and supply-side 
measures of health clinic quality were well balanced across the five study groups at baseline, this 
provides support for our identification strategy. We focus on the program effects on the treated 
households. 
We start by pooling the treatment arms to estimate two distinct specifications. First, we 
consider households that were either randomly selected to receive conditional cash transfers or 
randomly selected to receive unconditional cash transfers (see Panel B of Figure 1). This 
approach combines into one group the conditional cash transfers given to fathers or mothers and 
into a second group the unconditional cash transfers given to fathers or mothers. With this 
specification we focus on whether the conditionality matters and we ignore the intra-household 
allocation aspects of the design. Formally, the regression is specified as follows: 
(1)  ih ih h h ih X UCT CCT y           1 2 1 0  
where yih is the number of routine preventative health clinic visits for child i in household h, 
CCTh and UCTh are treatment indicators that take the value one if a child lives in a household h 
that was randomly selected to receive respectively, conditional or unconditional cash transfers 
and is zero otherwise, Xih is a vector of child characteristics (gender and age) and ε is an error   12
term.
8 The estimated impact for conditional cash transfers is given by α1 and for unconditional 
cash transfers by α2. 
Second, we consider households that were either randomly assigned to receive the 
stipends via the mother or via the father (Panel C of Figure 2). This approach combines into one 
group the conditional and unconditional cash transfers given to fathers and into a second group 
the conditional and unconditional cash transfers given to mothers. When estimating this 
specification, we focus on intra-household allocation (whether paying the stipends to the mother 
or the father leads to different outcomes), and we ignore the role that conditionality might play. 
We estimate the following regression: 
(2)  ih ih h h ih X CTM CTF y           1 2 1 0  
where CTFh indicates a household h that is randomly selected to receive cash transfer given to 
fathers, CTMh indicates a household h that is randomly selected to receive cash transfer given to 
mothers, and all of the other variables are as defined previously. In Equation 2, α1 and α2 
represent the impact of cash transfers to fathers and to mothers, respectively. 
It is plausible that mothers and fathers react differently not only to the transfers, but also 
to the conditionality. In order to test this hypothesis, we allow the four treatment groups to enter 
separately in the regression. The resulting specification is: 
(3)  ih ih h h h h ih X UCTM UCTF CCTM CCTF y               1 4 3 2 1 0  
where the four treatment groups are defined as binary variables and are represented by CCTFh 
(conditional cash transfers to fathers), CCTMh (conditional cash transfers to mothers), UCTFh 
(unconditional cash transfers to fathers) and UCTMh (unconditional cash transfers to mothers). 
                                                 
8 Correlation among the error terms of children in a given village experiencing the same shocks might bias the 
ordinary least squares standard errors downward, so in all regressions we cluster the standard errors at the village 
level.   13
All of the other variables are defined as before. The estimated impact of each treatment scheme 
is given by the associated coefficient, α1, α2, α3, and α4. 
4. Empirical Results 
In Table 4, we present results from estimating the three equations discussed above for routine 
preventative health clinic visits. Each regression includes controls for the child’s gender and year 
of birth cohort. All regressions are restricted to children under 60 months old. Column 1 focuses 
on the comparison between conditional and unconditional cash transfers, while Column 2 
focuses on the comparison between transfers given to fathers or mothers. Finally, in Column 3, 
we examine the impact of all four treatment groups separately. 
We find that conditional cash transfers have a larger impact on routine health clinic visits 
than unconditional cash transfers. Young children less than 60 months old in households that 
receive conditional cash transfers have 0.43 more routine preventative health clinic visits in the 
preceding year compared to comparable children in the control villages. This represents an 
increase of 42 percent compared to the average number of routine visits. We find no significant 
impact of unconditional cash transfers on these routine health visits, and relative to unconditional 
cash transfers, the impact on routine health clinic visits is significantly larger for conditional 
transfers. We are able to strongly reject equality between the coefficients on the conditional and 
unconditional variables with a p-value of 0.002. 
Turning to evaluate the impact of cash transfers given to fathers compared to mothers, in 
column 2, we estimate a regression with the same dependent variable but with independent 
variables indicating if a child was in a household where the cash transfers were given to fathers 
or to mothers. Overall, children in households that received cash transfers (either to the father or 
mother) receive more routine preventative health clinic visits than children in control   14
households, although neither coefficient is statistically significant. Although the point estimate is 
larger for children in households where the mother received the transfer (0.235), we cannot reject 
equality between that coefficient and the coefficient for cash transfer to fathers (0.070) with a p-
value of the test of equality of 0.35. 
The above results where the cash transfers are grouped by the presence or absence of 
conditionality (Column 1) and the transfer recipient’s gender (Column 2) potentially hide the fact 
that there could be significant differences between how conditionality interacts with a recipient’s 
gender. To explore this further, in Column 3, we estimate Equation 3 in which we include four 
indicator variables corresponding to each of the four different treatments (conditional cash 
transfers to fathers, conditional cash transfers to mothers, unconditional cash transfers to fathers, 
and unconditional cash transfers to mothers). Results highlight that conditionality is critical for 
improving take-up of routine preventative health clinic visits. Children living in households 
where the cash transfers were conditional and given to mothers have 0.446 more preventative 
health clinic visits and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For 
children living in households where the cash transfers were conditional and given to fathers, the 
results indicate they have 0.415 more routine health clinic visits, although the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at standard levels. In testing the equality of these two coefficients, we are 
not able to reject equality, with the p-value equal to 0.901. These results for conditional cash 
transfers contrast with those for unconditional cash transfers. Children living in households that 
received unconditional cash transfers given to fathers or living in households that received 
unconditional cash transfers given to mothers show no significant impact on the take-up of 
routine preventative health clinic visits. The point estimate is positive, but small for 
unconditional cash transfers to mothers and is actually negative for fathers, indicating children in   15
these two treatment arms are no better off compared to comparable children in the control 
households. Formally testing equality between the coefficients shows that the impact of 
conditional cash transfers to mothers is larger than both unconditional cash transfers to mothers 
or fathers. The impact of conditional cash transfers to fathers is larger than unconditional cash 
transfers to fathers and mothers, although we can only reject equality with a p-value of 0.156 for 
the test with mothers. 
In the next three tables, we examine if there is a heterogeneous impact of cash transfers 
based on child gender (Table 5), child age (Table 6), or the baseline poverty status of the 
household (Table 7). In Table 5, impacts of alternative cash transfers are fairly consistent across 
boys and girls. Conditional cash transfers have a larger impact than unconditional cash transfers 
for both boys and girls, and we are able to reject equality in both regressions (p-value equal to 
0.019 for boys and 0.002 for girls). We find no statistically significant impacts on routine health 
clinic visits when the cash transfers are grouped by mother or father (columns 2 and 5). We find 
suggestive evidence that conditional cash transfers to fathers have a larger impact on routine 
health clinic visits for girls (an additional 0.580 visits), while conditional cash transfers to 
mothers have a larger impact on health clinic visits for boys (an additional 0.505 visits). 
Conditional cash transfers to mothers still have a significant impact for girls, and we are not able 
to reject equality between the impact of conditional cash transfers to fathers or mothers (for 
either boys or girls). Unconditional cash transfers to fathers or mothers show no significant 
positive impact for either boys or girls. 
Table 6 presents separate results for younger (ages 0 to 23 months) and older (ages 24-59 
months) children. All of the impacts of cash transfers on routine preventative health clinic visits 
discussed previously are being driven by older children. This might be explained by the fact that   16
parents in Burkina Faso are less likely to bring older children for routine preventative care visits. 
Indeed, as noted previously, on average, younger children have more visits (1.43) than older 
children (0.80), so that, while routine visits for young children might already be frequent for 
young children in the absence of the transfers, the transfers might have had a relatively larger 
impact on the less frequent visits for older children. 
We find no statistically significant impact of cash transfers on routine health clinic visits 
for younger children. To put this in perspective, this means that young children (0-23 months) in 
control households are as equally likely to have gone to a health clinic for a routine visit as a 
young child in a treatment household. This contrasts with older children for whom there are large 
impacts of the cash transfers on the number of routine health clinic visits. Conditional cash 
transfers yield larger impacts on increasing the number of routine preventative health clinic visits 
compared to unconditional cash transfers, with an increase of 0.592 visits for the older children, 
representing an increase of 74 percent over the mean number of visits. For older children, cash 
transfers to mothers or to fathers show increases in routine health clinic visits, although only the 
coefficient on the mother’s variable is statistically significant. Finally, conditional cash transfers 
to fathers or mothers show larger impacts for the older children, increasing the number of health 
clinic visits by 0.630 and 0.558 visits, respectively. This represents increases of 79 and 70 
percent, respectively for cash transfers to fathers or mothers that are conditional, compared to the 
average number of routine health clinic visits children of this age receive. 
In Table 7, we do not find any significant differences between the impacts for cash 
transfers given to extremely poor or less poor households. As discussed in Section 2.1, recall that 
all households that were eligible to receive the cash transfers were below the estimated national 
poverty line. The further distinction in Table 7 is comparing extremely poor and less poor   17
households, which might explain the absence of differential impacts by poverty status.
9 
Conditional cash transfers increase the number of routine preventative health care visits for 
children in those households and the household’s poverty status does not alter this relationship 
(columns 1 and 4). There are no significant improvements on health clinic visits for the 
regressions when we group transfers to mothers or transfers to fathers. As before, conditionality 
is driving our observed results and the gender of the recipient does not matter, and the estimated 
impacts are similar between extremely poor and less poor households. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presents evidence of the health impacts from a cash transfer pilot program in rural 
Burkina Faso, the Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Program (NCTPP). Our evaluation focuses on 
routine preventative health clinic visits for children 0 to 5 years old. The NCTPP incorporated a 
random experimental design to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the following modalities for 
delivering cash transfers: conditional versus unconditional and transfers to mothers versus 
fathers. Families under the conditional cash transfer schemes were required to obtain child 
growth monitoring at local health clinics for all young children. 
Our results indicate that children in families that received conditional cash transfers had 
an additional 0.43 routine preventative health clinic visits during the previous year compared to 
children in the control households. These results contrast with those for unconditional cash 
transfers given to either fathers or mothers, which showed no beneficial impacts. As long as the 
transfers were conditional, we did not find any significant difference between whether the money 
was given to fathers or to mothers, indicating that at least for routine health clinic visits, the cash 
transfer recipient’s gender is not a critical factor influencing outcomes. One limitation of our 
                                                 
9 To make this additional distinction in Table 7, extremely poor households are defined as being below the median 
household per capita expenditure level in the baseline survey.   18
analysis is that the health clinic visits are self-reported by the parents. In future work, we will 
investigate more objectively measured child health outcomes such as anthropometrics and infant 
mortality. 
From a policy perspective, conditional cash transfers appear to have stronger beneficial 
impacts on increasing the number of routine health care visits for children. This finding should 
be balanced with the additional administrative and logistical costs implied by imposing and 
verifying the conditionality. For the outcome analyzed in this paper – routine preventative health 
clinic visits - the gender of the recipient does not seem to affect critically the impact of the cash 
transfers on those health outcomes. Such a conclusion, however, needs to be included in a larger 
analysis of other health and schooling outcomes as well as other age ranges for the children. 
Indeed, the NSPP is a broad social protection pilot program that covers all children until 
age 15 in the eligible households and aims to improve both their schooling and health outcomes. 
It should be emphasized that while we focus on children under age 5 in this analysis, those 
children could have benefited from the (larger) transfers received for their older siblings. It is not 
clear that by only implementing the part of the intervention targeted for young children (0 to 59 
months), similar health results would necessarily be obtained.   19
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Burkina Faso Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) 
Evaluation Data 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 (1)  (2) 
Household Characteristics    
Household size  7.023  3.294 
Number of children under 60 months  1.474  0.952 
Number of children age 5 to 15 years  2.317  1.772 
Proportion either parent ever enrolled in school  0.185  0.388 
Household expenditures per capita (in FCFA)  46257  66105 
    
Child Characteristics    
Child age (in months)  30.74  16.85 
Child gender (1=Female)  0.494  0.500 
Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits  1.025  1.823 
    
Number of Households  1618   
Number of Children  2559 
Notes: Household characteristics are based on the 1618 households that were eligible to receive 
cash transfers (treatment and control groups) and that have children under 60 months old. Child 
characteristics are based on the 2559 children under 60 months old in these households. Per 
capita household expenditures are measured in FCFA (415 FCFA=$1). Data source: Nahouri 
Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) evaluation data from 2010. 
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Table 2: Baseline Means and Randomization Balance 
 CCTF  CCTM  UCTF  UCTM  Control 
 Mean p-value Mean  p-value  Mean  p-value Mean  p-value Mean  p-value 
Child and Parent Characteristics:                  
Child is female  0.507  0.525  0.488  0.993  0.454  0.191  0.489  0.974  0.488  0.317 
Child age in months  29.745  0.095*  29.450  0.177  29.070  0.413  28.154  0.839  28.336  0.276 
Head of household is female  0.144  0.732  0.162  0.855  0.125  0.342  0.106  0.108  0.156  0.353 
Proportion either parent ever enrolled  0.155  0.806  0.179  0.501  0.184  0.420  0.200  0.298  0.143  0.824 
Number of wives of household head  1.056  0.564  1.064  0.496  1.121  0.122  1.141  0.078*  1.010  0.380 
Household size  6.535  0.157  6.422  0.276  6.897  0.016** 6.569  0.125  6.049  0.189 
Marital status=Monogamous  0.593  0.761  0.576  0.378  0.579  0.451  0.622  0.554  0.605  0.509 
Marital status=Polygamous  0.207  0.480  0.214  0.391  0.239  0.108  0.226  0.215  0.184  0.547 
Marital status=Single  0.200  0.802  0.210  0.971  0.181  0.449  0.152  0.105  0.211  0.362 
Ethnic group = Kassena  0.570  0.969  0.370  0.217  0.553  0.943  0.711  0.307  0.564  0.209 
Ethnic group = Nankana/Farfarse  0.383  0.915  0.487 0.464  0.271 0.545  0.144  0.119  0.366  0.134 
Ethnic group = Mossi  0.028  0.537  0.073  0.754  0.114  0.443  0.089  0.561  0.057  0.393 
Ethnic subgroup = Nakomse  0.578  0.971  0.505  0.564  0.609  0.745  0.585  0.919  0.574  0.927 
Religion = Muslim  0.215  0.963  0.262  0.437  0.221  0.907  0.257  0.546  0.211  0.917 
Religion = Christian  0.278  0.737  0.308  0.926  0.222  0.147  0.270  0.563  0.302  0.469 
Religion = Animist  0.498  0.849  0.414  0.465  0.544  0.536  0.459  0.835  0.478  0.701 
Number of wives of HH head’s father  2.180  0.939  2.209  0.709  2.508  0.097*  2.174  0.979  2.171  0.568 
Number of children of HH head’s father  9.089  0.980  9.215  0.798  9.835  0.347  8.955  0.839  9.075  0.875 
Village Level Health Clinic Variables                  
Villages per health clinic  9.53  0.593  10.57 0.885  9.73  0.782  12.08 0.425 10.31 0.411 
Number of days a doctor is present  5.091  0.871  4.455 0.576  4.375 0.582  4.125 0.515 5.250 0.818 
Number of nurses  3.467  0.406  3.286  0.352  3.333  0.458  3.500  0.574  4.000  0.863 
Childhood nutritional/growth counseling offered  0.867  0.184 0.929  0.370 0.933 0.366  0.692 0.089*  1.000 0.296 
Vaccines offered  0.933  0.371  0.929  0.370 0.933  0.366 0.769 0.164 1.000 0.461 
Nutritional supplements offered  0.733  0.796  0.929  0.309  0.667  0.545  0.462  0.051*  0.769  0.069* 
Health epidemics  0.667  0.231  0.571  0.565  0.538  0.656  0.636  0.370  0.462  0.648 
Source of funding for clinic (patient, govt., NGO)  1.200  0.321 1.214  0.383 1.267 0.542 1.692 0.287 1.385 0.127 
Notes: The treatment arms are abbreviated as CCTF (conditional cash transfers given to fathers), CCTM (conditional cash transfers given to mothers), 
UCTF (unconditional cash transfers given to fathers), and UCTM (unconditional cash transfers given to mothers). The p-values are from a Wald test 
comparing the treatment arm with the control group. In the last column (under the control group heading), the p-values are from an F-test of the joint 
test that the means of the five groups are equal. Robust standard errors, clustered at village level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Data source: Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) evaluation data from 2010.   23





















 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6) (7) 
HH expenditures per 















# children < 60 months  1.095  1.118  0.023  -0.083  -0.064  -0.169  0.062 
  (0.021)  (0.070) (0.097)  (0.163) (0.189) (0.161) (0.180) 
Number of adults  3.123  2.575  -0.548*** -0.005  0.156  -0.014  0.170 
  (0.033)  (0.119) (0.153)  (0.328) (0.319) (0.331) (0.320) 
Household  size  6.551  5.323  -1.228*** 0.524 0.478 0.309 0.848* 
  (0.062)  (0.214) (0.284)  (0.475) (0.518) (0.471) (0.501) 
HH head literate  0.157  0.189  0.032  0.007 -0.046 -0.001 -0.031 
  (0.007)  (0.035) (0.033)  (0.078) (0.094) (0.079) (0.093) 
HH head age  45.25  42.23  -3.02**  0.122  1.521  -1.935  3.821 
  (0.286)  (1.329) (1.330)  (2.986) (3.209) (3.014) (2.982) 
HH head educated  0.157  0.142  -0.015  -0.078  -0.106  -0.020  -0.181**
  (0.007)  (0.031) (0.033)  (0.071) (0.075) (0.060) (0.086) 
HH head gender   1.136  1.189  0.053*  0.092  0.085  0.173*  -0.025 
  (0.007)  (0.037) (0.032)  (0.106) (0.095) (0.093) (0.113) 
Polygamous  0.218  0.102  -0.116*** 0.049 0.016 0.028 0.053 
  (0.008)  (0.027) (0.037)  (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) 
Monogamous 0.593  0.042  0.069  -0.137  -0.160  -0.171*  -0.112 
  (0.010)  (0.661) (0.045)  (0.098) (0.099) (0.090) (0.115) 
Single  0.189  0.236 0.036  0.088 0.144 0.143 0.059 
  (0.008)  (0.038) (0.047)  (0.101) (0.094) (0.094) (0.109) 
Ethnic  group=Kassena  0.554  0.591  0.037  -0.063 -0.015 -0.033 -0.009 
  (0.010)  (0.044) (0.045)  (0.153) (0.152) (0.148) (0.161) 
Ethnic  group=Nankana  0.334  0.260  -0.074*  0.186 0.065 0.092 0.135 
  (0.009)  (0.039) (0.043)  (0.145) (0.140) (0.146) (0.144) 
Religion=Muslim  0.231  0.260 0.029  0.124 0.116 0.123 0.113 
  (0.008)  (0.039) (0.038)  (0.107) (0.111) (0.104) (0.115) 
Religion=Christian 0.272 0.378  0.106*** 0.022  -0.021  0.078  -0.102 
  (0.009)  (0.043) (0.041)  (0.090) (0.128) (0.082) (0.117) 
Religion=Animist 0.484  0.354  -0.130*** -0.129  -0.100  -0.180*  -0.018 
  (0.010)  (0.043) (0.045)  (0.095) (0.134) (0.098) (0.111) 
































Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column 1 presents means of household-
level characteristics from the baseline survey for the sample of households that were followed from the baseline 
to the two-year follow-up survey (non-attritors). Column 2 presents means for the sample of attritor households, 
and column 3 presents the average difference in characteristics between attritors and non-attritors. The 
treatment arms are abbreviated as CCT (conditional cash transfer), UCT (unconditional cash transfer), CTF 
(cash transfer given to fathers), and CTM (cash transfer given to mothers). Columns 4-7 test for differential 
impacts of attrition between treatment and control groups. Specifically, for each characteristic, we estimate 
difference-in-differences regressions comparing attritors and non-attritors for the treatment (CCT, UCT, CTF, 
CTM) and control groups. Data source: Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) data from 2010.   24
Table 4: Impact of Cash Transfers on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits 
 
Dependent Variable: Routine Health Clinic Visits       
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)  0.431**     
 [0.205]     
Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT)  -0.079     
 [0.195]     
Cash Transfer Fathers (CTF)    0.070   
   [0.209]   
Cash Transfer Mothers (CTM)    0.235   
   [0.201]   
Conditional Cash Transfer Fathers (CCTF)      0.415 
     [0.258] 
Conditional Cash Transfer Mothers (CCTM)      0.446**
     [0.223] 
Unconditional Cash Transfer Fathers (UCTF)      -0.216 
     [0.200] 
Unconditional Cash Transfer Mothers (UCTM)      0.046 
     [0.231] 
     
Child Age & Gender Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  2559  2559  2559 
P-value testing equality between CCT and UCT:  0.002    
P-value testing equality between Fathers and Mothers:   0.346   
P-value testing equality between CCTF and CCTM:     0.901 
P-value testing equality between CCTF and UCTF:     0.008 
P-value testing equality between CCTF and UCTM:     0.156 
P-value testing equality between CCTM and UCTF:     0.001 
P-value testing equality between CCTM and UCTM:     0.076 
P-value testing equality between UCTF and UCTM:     0.190 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the village level. *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions are restricted to children under 60 
months old and include child age fixed effects and child gender dummies. Data source: Nahouri 
Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) evaluation data from 2010.   25
Table 5: Impact of Cash Transfers on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits, By Gender 
 
  Boys   Girls  
Dependent Variable:  
  Routine Health Clinic Visits        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CCT  0.389    0.477**    
  [0.242]    [0.222]    
UCT  -0.045    -0.106    
  [0.229]    [0.207]    
Cash Transfer Fathers (CTF)    0.010      0.136   
   [0.232]      [0.235]   
Cash Transfer Mothers (CTM)    0.283      0.190   
   [0.240]      [0.210]   
CCT-Father    0.244      0.580* 
    [0.290]      [0.301] 
CCT-Mother    0.505*      0.384* 
    [0.269]      [0.223] 
UCT-Father    -0.169      -0.260 
    [0.234]      [0.203] 
UCT-Mother    0.075      0.023 
    [0.272]      [0.251] 
         
Child Age & Gender Fixed Effects? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number  of  observations  1296 1296 1296 1263 1263 1263 
P-value testing CCT = UCT:  0.019     0.002    
P-value testing CTF = CTM:   0.140     0.790   
P-value testing CCTF = CCTM:    0.354      0.497 
P-value testing CCTF = UCTF:    0.100      0.003 
P-value testing CCTF = UCTM:    0.547      0.076 
P-value testing CCTM = UCTF:    0.003      0.001 
P-value testing CCTM = UCTM:    0.102      0.128 
P-value testing UCTF = UCTM:    0.281      0.190 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the village level. *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions are restricted to children under 60 
months old and include child age fixed effects and child gender dummies. The treatment arms 
are abbreviated as CCT (conditional cash transfer), UCT (unconditional cash transfer), CTF 
(cash transfer given to fathers), CTM (cash transfer given to mothers), CCT-Father (conditional 
cash transfer given to fathers), CCT-Mother (conditional cash transfer given to mothers), UCT-
Father (unconditional cash transfer given to fathers), and UCT-Mother (unconditional cash 
transfer given to mothers). Data source: Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) evaluation 
data from 2010. 
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Table 6: Impact of Cash Transfers on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits, By Child Age 
 
  Young Children (0-23 
Months)    Old Children (24-59 
Months)   
Dependent Variable:  
  Routine Health Clinic Visits        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CCT  0.098    0.592***    
  [0.498]    [0.203]    
UCT  -0.516    0.143    
  [0.485]    [0.155]    
Cash Transfer Fathers (CTF)    -0.406      0.307   
   [0.488]      [0.192]   
Cash Transfer Mothers (CTM)    -0.086      0.391**  
   [0.498]      [0.172]   
CCT-Father    -0.030      0.630** 
    [0.492]      [0.308] 
CCT-Mother    0.198      0.558** 
    [0.554]      [0.218] 
UCT-Father    -0.704      0.033 
    [0.501]      [0.151] 
UCT-Mother    -0.347      0.244 
    [0.506]      [0.206] 
         
Child Age & Gender Fixed Effects? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  897  897  897  1662  1662  1662 
P-value testing CCT = UCT:  0.013     0.024    
P-value testing CTF = CTM:   0.196     0.671   
P-value testing CCTF = CCTM:    0.515      0.832 
P-value testing CCTF = UCTF:    0.010      0.051 
P-value testing CCTF = UCTM:    0.236      0.247 
P-value testing CCTM = UCTF:    0.016      0.013 
P-value testing CCTM = UCTM:    0.144      0.216 
P-value testing UCTF = UCTM:    0.211      0.280 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the village level. *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions are restricted to children under 60 
months old and include child age fixed effects and child gender dummies. The treatment arms 
are abbreviated as CCT (conditional cash transfer), UCT (unconditional cash transfer), CTF 
(cash transfer given to fathers), CTM (cash transfer given to mothers), CCT-Father (conditional 
cash transfer given to fathers), CCT-Mother (conditional cash transfer given to mothers), UCT-
Father (unconditional cash transfer given to fathers), and UCT-Mother (unconditional cash 
transfer given to mothers). Data source: Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot Project (NCTPP) evaluation 
data from 2010. 
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Table 7: Impact of Cash Transfers on Routine Preventative Health Clinic Visits,  
By Baseline Poverty Status 
 
  Poor Households    Non-poor Households   
Dependent Variable:  
  Routine Health Clinic Visits        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CCT  0.450*    0.389*    
  (0.239)    (0.234)    
UCT  -0.132    0.068    
  (0.215)    (0.222)    
Cash Transfer Fathers (CTF)    0.015      0.199   
   (0.233)      (0.240)   
Cash Transfer Mothers (CTM)    0.204      0.281   
   (0.228)      (0.223)   
CCT-Father    0.453      0.324 
    (0.302)      (0.298) 
CCT-Mother    0.447*      0.434* 
    (0.270)      (0.260) 
UCT-Father    -0.300      0.053 
    (0.207)      (0.274) 
UCT-Mother    0.029      0.081 
    (0.264)      (0.240) 
         
Child Age & Gender Fixed Effects? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  1731  1731  1731  828  828  828 
P-value testing CCT = UCT:  0.005     0.102    
P-value testing CTF = CTM:   0.364     0.685   
P-value testing CCTF = CCTM:    0.985      0.715 
P-value testing CCTF = UCTF:    0.006      0.387 
P-value testing CCTF = UCTM:    0.182      0.387 
P-value testing CCTM = UCTF:    0.002      0.173 
P-value testing CCTM = UCTM:    0.142      0.148 
P-value testing UCTF = UCTM:    0.145      0.913 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the village level. *significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions are restricted to children under 60 
months old and include child age fixed effects and child gender dummies. All households that 
were eligible to receive the cash transfers were below the estimated national poverty line. The 
further distinction in this table is comparing extremely poor and less poor households. Extremely 
poor households are defined as being below the median household per capita expenditure level in 
the baseline survey. The treatment arms are abbreviated as CCT (conditional cash transfer), UCT 
(unconditional cash transfer), CTF (cash transfer given to fathers), CTM (cash transfer given to 
mothers), CCT-Father (conditional cash transfer given to fathers), CCT-Mother (conditional cash 
transfer given to mothers), UCT-Father (unconditional cash transfer given to fathers), and UCT-
Mother (unconditional cash transfer given to mothers). Data source: Nahouri Cash Transfer Pilot 
Project (NCTPP) evaluation data from 2010.    28
Figure 1: Summary of Treatment and Control Group Randomization Plan 
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                 | 
________|____________






30 villages  
(1080 households)  
 
Randomized to CCT 
  30  villages   
(1080 households)  
 
Randomized to  
UCT 
  15  villages   






Panel C Transfers to Fathers versus Transfers to Mothers Comparison 
     75  villages 
(2775 households) 
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________|_____________






30 villages  




  30  villages   




  15  villages   
(615 households)  
 
Randomized to 
Control Group 
 
 